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AN OBJECTIVE STUDY OF SOME MORAL JUDGMENTS.

BY FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

In an article in the *Philosophical Review* for May, 1896, an attempt was made to explain, in part at least, the continued existence, through generations of controversy, of incompatible theories of the moral life. It was shown that thinkers had failed to reach conclusions commanding universal consent, largely because they had based their descriptions and consequent explanations mainly, if not entirely, upon the data supplied by their own consciousness. This method of procedure might have done little harm had its implied postulate, the absolute uniformity of the moral nature, been true, but facts were adduced which seemed to force us to the conclusion either that the great majority of moralists have been and are either hopelessly incompetent or careless, or both, or that there exist different types of moral judgment, which are represented with varying degrees of completeness in different persons. If we accept the latter alternative we shall cease to wonder that those who never turn their eyes to the fields that lie beyond the narrow boundaries of their own lives, should bring in reports that are apparently impossible to harmonize. If this position be sound, the great desideratum in ethics to-day is a complete knowledge of the phenomena of the moral experience, as these are to be found in the men and women—and children—about us. Works on the morals of savages or of semi-civilized peoples, works on European morals in past centuries, valuable as these may be, are not sufficient. Even where they are absolutely reliable, the information they give us is still too meagre; we may almost say that they fail entirely to show us “the great heart of the machine.” The same criticism holds of the material supplied by the biographies and autobiographies of the great dead. In their best estate they give us nothing more than passing glimpses of the life within. What is needed to-day is detailed information touching every phase of the ethical experience, including the apparently insignificant and uninteresting as well as the fundamental and impressive. Even if the scien-

tific problems of analysis and explanation be relegated to the background, as is the tendency at present, and all interest be concentrated upon the determination of the *summum bonum*—that which gives conduct its ultimate value,—little progress toward a final agreement is to be hoped for between the members of opposing schools, except as both parties are forced to face the question of the nature and extent of possible divergencies from their own standards and modes of thought.

The present article is an attempt to suggest a method for investigating the material which has been thus neglected. Since it aims primarily to set forth the validity and usefulness of a method rather than to add to the already acquired stock of information (though we believe it will not be found wanting in this respect), we have selected as its subject the examination of certain assertions in Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory." These assertions form the main part of the foundation of his system, and yet the author presents us with no other evidence of their universality than his own emphatic *ipse dixit* and the familiar but now rather worn assurance that the existence of the moral life stands or falls with them. The writings of the great apostle of liberal theology have been chosen for our purpose, mainly because they belong to that small class of contemporary works that throw the emphasis upon the scientific as opposed to the speculative problems of ethics, that seek primarily to discover the conditions under which moral judgments arise rather than to ask for their ultimate validity. Not that this last question is not of the highest importance (Martineau himself by no means neglects it), but the more pressing need *at present* is for careful study in the other direction.

The specific theses which it is proposed to consider are four in number. The first has to do with the fundamental nature of moral judgment. Motives, not actions, are declared to be its objects. When two incompatible impulses appear in consciousness and struggle with each other for supremacy, we become directly aware of their relative excellence or of their comparative moral worth. "This apprehension is no mediate discovery of ours, of which we can give an account; but is immediately inherent in the very experience of the principles themselves—a revelation inseparable from their appearance side by side. By simply entering the stage together and catching the inner eye, they disclose their respective worth and credentials."* The

*"Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II, pp. 44, 45.

significance of these statements will appear more clearly if we bring them face to face with a criticism upon them urged by Professor Sidgwick. The determination of what is right will not, he thinks, except in the most trifling cases, take the form of a direct comparison of the motives which primarily urge us to action. For instance, if the duel is started between resentment and compassion, or between love of ease and love of gain, "the struggle will not be fought out in the lists so marked out, since higher motives would inevitably be called in as the conflict went on, regard for justice and social well-being on the side of resentment, regard for health and ultimate efficiency for work on the side of love of ease; and it would be the intervention of these higher motives that would decide the struggle, so far as it was decided rightly. . . . So that the comparison ultimately decisive would be not between the lower motives primarily conflicting, *but between the effects of the different lines of conduct to which these lower motives respectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end or ends of reasonable action.*"* If in common with the representatives of many otherwise conflicting schools we call this end the interests or the welfare of those thereby affected, the problem to be solved may be formulated as follows: When two alternatives present themselves before a man for moral evaluation, is his judgment determined by noting their relative excellence or admirableness in themselves considered, or does he ask what the effects of the two courses of action will be upon the welfare of those thereby affected?

The second assertion to be tested affirms the absolute uniformity of moral judgments when the problem to be solved has been stripped of all irrelevant considerations with regard to the working of external forces and has been reduced to a question of the relative worth of the competing motives or groups of motives.** It must, of course, be granted that the person judging has some knowledge of the meaning of the terms involved, and furthermore that his inward eye has not been dimmed by habitual disregard of the dictates of conscience. These conditions being granted, all apparent variations from a uniform standard are due, we are told, to the fact that moral judgment involves a comparison of two elements, and often but one of these is explicitly put forward. If I ask: Was B the right spring of action to follow under the given circumstances?

*"Methods of Ethics," 4th edition, p. 372.

**"Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II, pp. 77 f.; p. 102.

one person may indeed answer yes, and the other no. But the contradiction is only apparent. For the first party was mentally comparing it with C, and the other with A. No wonder, then, that the former looked upon it as the higher alternative and the course of action it urged to as right, while the latter judged this same course of action to be wrong.*

Furthermore, the revelation of the moral worth of the springs of action is asserted to be immediate, because direct. "The moment this condition is realized (*i. e.*, when the incompatible impulses enter consciousness), we are sensible of a contrast between them. . . . requiring a phraseology for its expression such as this: that one is *higher, worthier* than the other. . . . There is no analysis or research required; it is a choice of Hercules, only without the reasoning and the rhetoric; the claims are decided by a glance at their face."**

From the uniformity and immediacy of the moral judgment follows directly its certainty, the sense of necessity, untroubled by a single doubt. If the matter is decided at the first glance without analysis and without reasoning, and if the decision will hold for all time and in every place, the impulses under inspection remaining identical, then evidently no place is left for hesitation or uncertainty. As well might we doubt whether the sensation of pure white on a black background involved the consciousness of two sense qualities or only one.***

To test these statements a series of ten questions was recently given to the members of the psychology classes in the University of Wisconsin, resulting in the receipt of 152 sets of answers, fifty-seven from young women, ninety-five from young men. The students were members of the junior and senior classes and averaged about 21 years of age. As far as is known, no one of them had previously made any study of theoretical ethics, or had, at most, anything beyond a casual acquaintance with any department of the literature of the subject. They were requested to prepare their replies without consulting with any one, in order that these might represent the result of their own unassisted judgment. They were urged to state, as far as possible, the reasons for their conclusions with the utmost fullness; so generously was this request complied with that their papers averaged between 400 and 500 words in length. In order to encourage complete frankness, assurance was

**Ibid.*, pp. 61 f. Note the examples given.

***Ibid.*, pp. 44, 45.

****Ibid.*, pp. 72; 454.

given that under no circumstances would the identity of the writer of any statement be revealed. It should be added that the students had no idea of the use to which their work would be put and no reason to suppose that it would ever be examined by anyone besides myself. The temptation to talk solely for effect was thus reduced to a minimum. The questions were presented to them in type-written form during their regular recitation hour. They were requested to hand in written answers at the next meeting of the class, three days later. Beyond the directions already referred to, they had simply to be told to indicate the time after each question which was required for its decision; to mark each answer which they did not feel perfectly certain about, "doubtful;" and finally, if unable to come to a conclusion in any case, to state this fact instead of merely passing it by without mention. Practically no explanation was added to the printed text, beyond the information that numbers II, III, and with slight additions, I, were taken directly from life; and furthermore that the circumstances described in I (c) were very nearly realized in a railroad wreck in Ohio a number of years ago.

The questions were as follows:

1. Several years ago in a railroad wreck a lady was imprisoned in the débris in such a way that escape was impossible. Her husband, who might have extricated himself with an effort, deliberately chose to remain and die with her, in order that he might give her the support and comfort of his presence in her last moments. She herself, we must suppose, was not aware of the possibility of his escape, otherwise his aim would of course have been defeated. What is to be said of the moral character of his choice in each of the following cases? (a) If he was a clerk with the expectations of the average of his class and had no family ties apart from his wife. (b) Position as in (a), but he had a mother living with him in his home, who was very much devoted to him, but not dependent upon him for support. (c) Position again as in (a). He had a distant relative, a lady who was an invalid and absolutely dependent upon him for support. (d) If he had been a clergyman doing a great deal of good. (e) If he had been a Morse, conscious that he was on the eve of the solution of the problem of the electric telegraph. (f) If he had been an artist of very exceptional talents.

2. (a) In a small western village a switchman was just about to turn the switch for an approaching express train when he saw his little son, his only child, playing upon the track. The choice had to be made between the life of the babe and the lives of the passengers. What ought he to have done? (b) In the case just cited the man was on duty. What should be the decision under the following circumstances?

A drunken switchman has left the switch open. A man who lives near the tracks notices the open switch on his way home from work and is just about to turn it to save the train, when he sees his only child upon the track just in front of the engine. The alternative is as in (a).

3. A young man taught for a year in a private school in New York with a great deal of success. At the close of the school year he was complimented highly by the principal upon the character of his work, and, although no definite engagement was made, he was led to believe that his services would undoubtedly be desired for the ensuing year. All summer he tried to bring about a definite understanding with his employer, but letters mysteriously failed to reach their destination, etc., till when the end of September had come, no contract had been agreed upon. Then at last he succeeded in getting a personal interview with the principal. The latter offered him a salary of \$600, only two-thirds the amount he had received the year before, claiming the services in question were worth no more to him. At this the young man could only believe he had been tricked. He had no friends in the city, and his parents in a distant part of the country were unable to support him. He was just graduated from college, and had had no experience in other lines of work. Almost all school positions were already filled. In each of the following circumstances what would it have been his duty to do, or is he under no moral obligation one way or the other? (a) If he had had \$500 in the bank. (b) If he had had only enough to support him for a month or two. (c) If he had had \$500, but a wife dependent upon him for support. She, however, being willing to have him do whatever he thinks right. (d) Money enough for only a month or two, and a wife as in (c).

4. A timid child is offered some money to go into a dark room in a distant part of the house and remain there five minutes. Has he done wrong if he goes? Or is no moral question involved? The child is assumed to be old enough to be able to distinguish between right and wrong.

5. The following might have happened at the Johnstown (Penn.) flood. A man found he had just time either to warn his wife or two other women (not relatives). Both these women have family ties, etc., so that looked upon purely from an objective standpoint the death of anyone will involve as great a loss to all concerned as the death of another. What is it his duty to do?

6. In 1773, at the age of 47, John Howard began what was to prove his life work, the investigation of the prisons of England, which finally resulted in a complete revolution in the English prison system. The prosecution of this work necessitated constant traveling from place to place, and in consequence he was compelled to leave his eight-year old son under the care of strangers, for the mother had died several years before. At an early age the boy became dissipated, and before he was twenty-one was morally a wreck. The father knew what his son's habits were. On the other hand he had no evidence whatever that anyone else stood ready to take up his work for the prisoners in case he abandoned it. Suppose that he was fully convinced that under his own guidance his son might be trained to lead an honorable, moral life, was it his duty to drop his work for ten or fifteen years till his son had grown up, and thus delay and perhaps postpone indefinitely the possibility of the needed reforms, or did his duty lie with the work he had begun?

7. In Shakespeare's "Tempest" Prospero, Duke of Milan, leaves the government of the city entirely in the hands of his brother in order that he may devote himself exclusively to what may be called scientific pursuits. In other words he gives up political power in order to gain knowledge and culture. Provided his brother had been just as good a ruler as himself, and was glad to assume the duties of the office, was such a choice praiseworthy or blameworthy (morally), or was it morally indifferent?

8. It is related of the English statesman, William Pitt, that he once fell in love with a young lady, but would not permit himself to seek to win her because he believed marrying her would hinder his advancement in public life. Was such a decision morally praiseworthy, or was it wrong, or was it morally indifferent? It is assumed that in making his decision he was moved mainly by ambition, and not by a design to be useful to his country. If you consider no moral question was involved in his decision, would you think the better of him for choosing one or the other of these alternatives? If so, which?

9. If you had a friend who was a Spiritualist, would you consider it your duty to attempt to undeceive him, as long as his beliefs were harming no one else, in case that by so doing you felt certain you would (a) make him permanently unhappy, or that (b) you would weaken his moral character? Would you consider it *wrong* to do so in (a) or (b)?

10. A young man with talents adapting him about equally for trade or study, who is just about to enter college, is offered a business position that promises to lead to wealth. The demands that will be made upon his time and energy are so great that he will be unable to carry on his studies in any form. The culture he will get out of the proposed career is as near zero as possible. Is he morally blameworthy if he accepts it? If not, would you think less of him if he accepted?

In the tables, which summarize results, *R* stands for the judgment, "He did right"; *W*, "He did wrong"; *D* means that the person interrogated could not come to a decision; *X*, that no moral question was involved. The person before whom the alternatives are supposed to have been placed is therein assumed to have chosen as indicated, in each of the following cases: I: The husband remained with his wife; II: The father saved his child instead of the train; III: The young man refused the position; IV: The child refused to go into the room in order to gain the money offered him; V: The man saved his wife; VI: Howard devoted himself to the reformation of his son (this form was adopted for the sake of uniformity with II and V); VII: Prospero devoted himself to his studies; VIII: Pitt chose to gratify his ambition; IX: I conceive it to be my duty to attempt to undeceive my friend; X: The young man declined the business position.

It will be convenient to begin our investigation with a study of the alleged uniformity of moral judgments. For this purpose the replies to questions I, II, IV, V, VI, and IX supply the best material, because these offer comparatively small opportunity for differences in interpretation, and where the grounds for the decision are stated with any degree of fullness, ambiguous answers can therefore be easily eliminated. The following table gives a summary view of the results obtained:

		CLASS (1).			CLASS (2).			Final Total.
		Women.	Men.	Total.	Women.	Men.	Total.	
I	(a) R	8	6	14	16	17	33	47
	W	7	25	32	5	12	17	49
	D	1	1	2	0	1	1	3
	(b) R	14	6	20	6	7	13	33
	W	14	41	55	6	13	19	74
	D	1	0	1	1	1	2	3
	(c) R	9	4	13	0	1	1	14
	W	19	44	63	13	20	33	96
	D	1	1	2	0	1	1	3
	(d) R	11	5	16	1	4	5	21
	W	16	41	57	13	17	30	87
	D	1	0	1	0	1	1	2
	(e) R	11	6	17	1	4	5	22
	W	16	44	60	10	16	26	86
	D	2	0	2	1	2	3	5
IV	(f) R	12	6	18	1	6	7	25
	W	15	37	52	11	17	28	80
	D	2	0	2	1	1	2	4
	R	6	10	16	5	4	9	25
	W	0	0	0	1	4	5	5
	X	9	8	17	27	52	79	96
	D	0	0	0	1	2	3	3

		Women.	Men.	Total.
II (a)	R	0	3	3
	W	56	85	141
	D	0	1	1
(b)	R	9	21	30
	W	43	66	109
	D	4	2	6
V	R	41	68	109
	W	11	20	31
	D	3	3	6
VI	R	33	31	64
	W	14	47	61
	D	2	3	5
IX (1) a	R	3	10	13
	W	42	69	111
	D	3	1	4
(1) b	R	1	1	2
	W	44	78	122
	D	3	2	5
(2) a	Yes	29	53	82
	No	7	5	12
	D	1	0	1
(2) b	Yes	39	60	99
	No	4	3	7
	D	1	0	1

In question I the intention was to assume that the man by remaining in the wreck really would have done more to comfort the last moments of his doomed wife than by

leaving her to die alone (human nature being what it is) and that this was the consideration that led him to remain. Furthermore, that the value of his life, whether to society or to individuals, would have outweighed in each case the value to his wife of his presence at her side during the short time that was to elapse before death came to claim his own. Of course we are not unaware that many moralists believe that they believe that all such comparisons of values is impossible. We are not here concerned to deny this doctrine. 129 writes: "It seems to me that the good he could do by living would in every case far exceed the good done his wife by remaining with her." The problem is: This premise, as well as the others just mentioned, being granted, what will be the decision of different persons upon the morality of the choice? All papers that failed to face *this* question were thrown out. Among them were of course those who denied that the husband, by remaining with his wife, would really have comforted her, or at least to the same extent as would have the knowledge of his safety (a proposition which for many or perhaps most women would doubtless be true). Again, in twenty papers his action was denominated suicide, and as such condemned without qualification. These were without exception rejected, though it is possible that in the minds of some of the writers, this subsumption did not stand as the sole justification of the reprobation expressed. Finally all those were regarded as not meeting the conditions imposed by the problem that held in (a) that the life of a man in a clerk's position, with no family ties, would probably be of no special value to the world. After excluding all doubtful cases, forty-eight answers to (a) remained that gave evidence, apparently beyond the possibility of a doubt, of a complete understanding of the question in the form intended; to (b) there were seventy-six such answers; to (c) seventy-eight; to (d) seventy-four; to (e) sixty-nine; to (f) seventy-two. These are designated in the table as class (1). In addition there was a large percentage of papers whose answers were too indefinite, mainly because of brevity, to make possible any opinion whether they were a reply to the real question or not. They appear in the table as class (2). If the results thus obtained are of any value whatever, it will be seen that the alleged uniformity of moral judgments is an assumption utterly at variance with the facts. Everything, of course, depends upon the nature of our replies, but we believe they will bear careful scrutiny. That the reader may judge of their character for himself, we subjoin two representatives of class (1):

15 (a)-(f). I think that he should have stayed with his wife under all of these circumstances, as a man's first duty is always to his wife if he has one. His love for his wife and his sorrow in seeing her dying ought to be too great at that time to allow him to have any thoughts for himself, his own advancement, or what he could do for others, even though it might have been better for the world's advancement—as in cases (d)-(f)—if he had left his wife.

184 (a). To me it seems that had this man saved himself it would have been more right than to have sacrificed himself in order to give his wife the comfort of his presence in her last moments. Even in the case (a), though he was but a clerk with average expectations, it seems to me it would have been a more moral action to save himself, since there lies before every man, however humble his circumstances and in whatever position he may be placed, an opportunity for doing good. There was this possibility before this man, and on this possibility I base my belief.*

If it should still be urged that the appearance of diversity could be cleared away were we able to penetrate into the minds of the writers, and look upon the problem in all its ramifications, just as it presented itself to them in the moment of decision, we can confine the issue to (a).

Thirteen of those who approve the choice in this case, assert that it should have been adhered to throughout under all the conditions that follow (from *b* to *f*). Of these thirteen again, ten justify their position by alleging that a man's first duty is always to his wife, the majority adding expressly that his choice ought not to have been influenced at all by considerations of the good he might have done had he left his wife to die alone. On the other hand, after throwing out all papers that resort to doubtful subsumptions, irrelevant considerations, etc., we have still thirty-two replies that condemn the choice in (a)—and of course in all the following—in language so definite that there is no mistaking the meaning. Here, then, we seem to have a solid mass of material which no further criticism could destroy, and we therefore appear to be justified in holding that the divergence with regard to this alternative, at least, is absolute and irreconcilable.

Turning now to the questions that follow we obtain precisely the same results. At one time the two contradictory views may be about equally well represented; at another, we may find a small group of dissentients confronting a compact majority. But this minority, however small, is always as firmly convinced of the soundness of its conclusions as if it were the appointed spokesman of the universal conscience, and under no circumstances have we the right to ignore its existence or to scorn its pretensions to moral insight. In what follows we have simply to take such

* Numbers 1-57 are written by women; numbers 101-195 by men.

explanations as are requisite for the interpretation of the results tabulated on page 202, and to quote typical examples of the various views expressed.

Question II was so definite that practically all of the replies to it could be counted without fear of error. Some few indeed, as will be seen by referring to the table, are not recorded. As a matter of fact the total never reaches its limit of 152. This may be due in any particular instance to one of a variety of causes, which it would be tedious to enumerate, as they can easily be imagined. In this case the total rises to 145, which is "high-water mark," as the newspapers say.

The following are representative answers:

103 (a). I think he ought to have saved the life of his child. I can give no very definite reason for it, but it seems to me it would be right.

123 (b). The man's first duty is to his child in this case, for he has [only] a secondary duty to road and passengers. [His answer in (a) was, save the train.]

179 (a). Duty should outweigh any other consideration in the man's mind. He did right in sticking to his post. It was a great sacrifice, but a noble one. (b) The question for the second man is: Shall I save one or many? The *one* is dependent upon him, but his loss will bring grief to only one home. The wrecking of the train is liable to bring life-long sorrow to perhaps many homes. He did right if he stood by the switch.

Another writing in a similar strain, adds: "However, not one in ten thousand would do it."

Question V again seems to offer little or no room for misinterpretation. As formulated it may indeed be "abstract"; yet, let it be given all the concrete setting imaginable, the principle at issue would still be the same. Certainly there is no mistaking the position of those we quote:

164. If he knew hundreds of people were to be swept away and drowned, without time enough to warn both of the parties, I should say it was his duty to save his wife.

129. I believe it would have been his duty to save his wife. A man is supposed to be the protector of his family first, and should rescue them unless he felt he could do *very much* more good in some other way. I do not consider that the rescue of the two other women would have done enough more good to sanction it.

158. All other things being equal, the number of lives he was able to save [determines what] is the proper impulse [to follow], and not his personal relation to the persons in danger. But I should not condemn a man for saving his wife in preference to two other women, and I doubt if any one else would condemn him. The numbers in this case are too nearly equal, though of course the fundamental principle is the same.

45. It was his duty to warn the two women, even if he had to lose his wife. Two whole families should not be made desolate to save his wife. It was plainly his duty.

Question VI assumes that the amount of good which Howard could have accomplished by continuing his work of prison reform was greater than it would have been had he devoted himself to the training of his son; how much greater, Howard himself could of course not know. It goes without saying that different persons will estimate the effects and the probabilities to be considered differently, nevertheless the contradictions to be found here are genuine, as the quotations that follow will show:

184. If John Howard felt confident that he could train his son into a moral life, I believe it was his duty to drop his work of reforming the prisoners, even if thereby it would be indefinitely postponed. I think a man's first duty to be the training of his own children.

112. To my mind Mr. Howard's duty was to carry out his prison reform work. He thereby saved many persons from becoming moral wrecks, whereas if he had given up his work he would have saved only one. The family tie is not sufficient to cause the sacrifice of many for one on that account.

With these unambiguous utterances in mind it will be found profitable to examine Martineau's attempt to account for the contradictory judgments that Howard's career has always called forth. (See "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II, p. 62).

If the answers to IX are to be conclusive, one condition must be taken for granted which is not expressly mentioned in the text, namely, that, as one student puts it, "the Spiritualist belongs to the harmless type" and is therefore not likely to injure anyone else by what are here assumed to be his superstitious beliefs. An explicit statement of this condition was not demanded. It will be either stated (as it is by many) or assumed by all those who do not consider it a duty to deprive him of his faith. The only ambiguity will be in the answers of those who contend that all error must be killed regardless of consequences. In this class there is but a single paper that certainly meets all the conditions required, though at least two others offer every appearance of being conceived in the same spirit. But the outcome would have been the same had this position been entirely unrepresented on our list, for it has elsewhere found a champion who, in definiteness of statement, leaves nothing to be desired, while his rare attainments and disciplined judgment insure us equally against hasty and ill-considered expressions of opinion and against utterances that are the outcome of mere narrow-minded bigotry or provincialism. We refer to the brilliant author of the "History of Rationalism in Europe." His view may profitably be compared with that of the majority of our students.

122 (a). It would be my duty to warn him in case (a), as happiness is a minor thing compared with the possession of truth. There is a happiness in drifting and sometimes an unhappiness in struggling against the current, but drifting is wrong. (b) If I thought it would permanently injure his character, I should not speak to him, but I should not think it was wrong [to do so] if there was merely danger of unsettling it with a future chance of helping.*

49 (a) and (b). I should consider it wrong to do so in either case. Nothing would be gained, and harm would be done.

52 (a) and (b). If undeceiving my Spiritualistic friend is going to make him unhappy and morally weak, I should consider it wrong to do so. What is the use of any belief unless it brings happiness and moral strength? What have you got if you permanently take these away?

131 (a). While I do not consider happiness the ultimate end of man, yet I believe that to wantonly make a person unhappy is unjustifiable unless more vital issues than this case supposes are involved.

Mr. Lecky: Superstitions appeal to our hopes as well as our fears. They often meet and gratify the inmost longings of the heart. They supply conceptions on which the imagination most fondly dwells. They sometimes even impart a new sanction to moral truths. . . . The possibility of often adding to the happiness of men by diffusing abroad, or at least sustaining pleasing falsehoods, and the suffering that must commonly result from their dissolution, can hardly reasonably be denied. There is one, and but one, adequate reason that can always justify men in critically reviewing what they have been taught. It is the conviction that opinions should not be regarded as mere mental luxuries, that truth should be deemed an end distinct from and superior to utility, and that it is a moral duty to pursue it, whether it leads to pleasure or whether it leads to pain.**

Question IV was selected with a view to discovering the attitude of common sense toward the dictum of Martineau that fear is higher than love of money. In attempting to make such a test we must not for a moment be supposed to

*There is no advocate of the programme, Truth at *any* cost, whose statements are definite enough to be worth printing.

**“History of European Morals,” Vol. I, pp. 52-54. Lecky’s attitude toward his own opinion is somewhat difficult to determine. From page 50 it appears that this judgment is conceived to be a plain deliverance of the universal moral consciousness. “The considerations I have adduced will, I think, be sufficient to show that the utilitarian principle, if pushed to its full logical consequences, would be by no means as accordant with ordinary moral notions as is sometimes alleged; that it would, on the contrary, lead to conclusions utterly and outrageously repugnant to the moral feelings it is intended to explain. I will . . . [advert] to two great fields in which, as I believe, it would prove especially revolutionary. . . . [One] sphere is that of speculative truth,” etc. And yet on page 54, note 2, he writes: “The opposite view” (to that of his own) “in England is continually expressed in the saying, ‘You should never pull down an opinion until you have something to put in its place.’” Perhaps his object here is merely to point out the incompatibility of this maxim with what he supposes to be the ethical axiom of the supreme obligation of devotion to truth.

assent to the proposition that either love of money or fear, abstractly considered, can have any definite position in the moral scale. Nevertheless it seemed at once possible and profitable to collect and compare judgments upon the relative position of fear in a concrete case with the desire on the part of a child for a definite sum of money whose employment could easily be imagined. As in I, the answers must be divided in two classes, (1): those that revealed unmistakably a recognition of the fact that the conflict lay between the fear of the dark and the desire for the money; and (2) those which, while apparently based on this conception of the problem, did not contain an explicit statement to that effect. All papers were excluded that based their condemnation of the child for taking the money, upon the possible injury that might result from the shock to his nervous system. Of those who asserted that no moral question was involved, some added that they should admire the child more if he refused the money; this declaration was, however, as always, offset by a contrary one, a certain number preferring to see the desire for the money get the better of his fear. The following quotations are taken from class (1):

154. "I think that the child would do wrong to go, as the motive is a low one, and the timidity should be overcome without bribery."

104. "If the desire for the money is a stronger motive than the fear of the dark, the child had a perfect right to go."

138. "The child's action is *morally* indifferent. I should think better of him if he let his desire for the money overcome his fear."

It will be observed that the returns from questions III, VII, VIII and X have been given no place in the tabulated reports. The reason is that they do not admit of a yes and no classification, as the questions themselves do not pretend to enumerate every one of the relevant considerations that might properly enter into a decision, and what is more important, admit of being looked at from more than one point of view. The significance of this latter fact will be brought out in another place. At present we shall confine ourselves to showing the existence of contradictory opinions here just as in everything that has preceded.

Number III raises the question whether the impulse to resent a certain injury is higher than the prosaic but indispensable desire to earn a living. It is not claimed that all the conditions are named which might properly enter into the consideration of these alternatives. Nevertheless it is believed that a comparison of the following opinions will not be without value:

168. The moral obligation is but slight, for teachers are so easily found, that his refusing to teach would hurt his employer little, if any, and would practically amount to biting off his own nose to spite his face. What there is, however, is on the side of his staying away. He should, if possible, refuse to teach on account of the harmful effect on his moral stamina of feeling for a year that he had bowed the knee to trickery and imposition. In (a) he should go; (d), he should stay; (b) and (c), doubtful.

56 (a) and (b). His duty is to refuse the position and trust to fortune; his self-respect demands that much. (c) Swallow his pride and accept the place. A man with a wife to support should run no risks. (d) Same as (c).

122. In all cases but (d) he should refuse the position. He owes a great deal to himself, to his manhood and independence. Except in (d) there is a moral obligation. However, case (b) is doubtful.

Some go so far as to claim that he should refuse the position in every case, one person maintaining that in (c) and (d) his duty to do so was not in the least affected by whether his wife consented to this course or not. Let us now turn to the other side.

50 (a)-(d). I think that under all the circumstances mentioned the young man ought to have accepted the salary of \$600. Although it would be very humiliating for him to do so, rather than run the risk of remaining idle, he ought to pocket his pride and accept the principal's offer.

191 (a) and (b). Do not appear to me to be cases of morals, but of ordinary sense. (a) If by waiting he could get a better position in the future, he had better spend his capital and wait. (b) Better go to work at a low salary, although tricked, than starve — pride does not furnish a substantial repast.*

Question VII deals with Prospero and his transfer of the government to his brother.

26. Morally praiseworthy, as self-culture, and the training of one's powers to their highest is one of our greatest and chiefest duties. These are among the highest ends in life.

161. Taking moral to mean the preferring of the higher and finer to the lower, I should say he did right; yet it strikes me that there is little moral quality in the choice.

167. Morally indifferent. No one other than Prospero is either prejudiced or benefited by his action.

43. The action was blameworthy if he was pursuing his studies simply for his own selfish pleasure. One hasn't the right to live simply to gain knowledge and culture for one's own enjoyment.

VIII is a problem which we are told the younger Pitt was called upon to face. What will be the attitude of common sense toward his choice? Was his ambition to become the first commoner of England higher in moral worth than the love that prompted to marriage, or was it lower, or finally,

*Additional examples will be found in the appendix.

was he at liberty to do as he pleased? The majority, represented by ninety-one papers, declare for the last. Of this number sixteen inform us that they admire him more for preferring ambition to love; forty-four would think better of him had he given up his dream of fame and power in order to marry; seven feel no preference, and twenty-four express no opinion. Eighteen others declare that one of the motives as such stands on a higher moral plane than its competitor and an obligation therefore exists to choose it. All but one assign this position to affection. The answers not enumerated here will be accounted for later. The quotations which follow will illustrate the various types:

35. I consider Pitt's decision *morally* praiseworthy, if he was thoroughly convinced the lady would hinder his life work; for ambition should stand higher in our estimation than love.

28. I believe that love should come before ambition always, and think less of Pitt, as I do of Goethe and his Faust, for choosing the latter. A man who followed his ambition rather than his love, one has an instant dislike for. I can not understand such a man. Why love should take the lead of ambition I can not explain, simply that it is so. The "should" means moral duty. [With this we may compare 2: It stunted his character to put ambition before love.]

53. It was merely a struggle between love and ambition. I consider no moral question involved. I should think the better of him for choosing the former alternative, other things being equal.

188. I can't see any moral question. I should think better of him for following ambition.

37. No moral question involved, as the young lady knew nothing of his affection, and, so far as we know, had no thought of him as a suitor. Seeing his ambition outweighed his love for the lady, he was perfectly free to lead a life of "single blessedness." In this case I think one decision as good as the other.

The young man who is offered a position in business just as he is about to enter college (X) finds the desire for wealth coming into competition with the attractions of culture. In the answers that follow, interest in the problems or the activities of business life for their own sake (there would be little room for such problems in a business of slight culture value), and all considerations of the value to others of his money or his training and knowledge do not enter as determining factors, and the decision turns solely upon the relative claims of the two first mentioned alternatives.

Number 121 writes:

A man should so direct his work and thoughts in life as to get out of himself the *best* possible results; should not let the financial future throw his nature's future into shadow. It would be wrong to accept the position. I have been in the exact position described.

47. Not morally blameworthy if he accepts it. But I should prefer culture to wealth. I respect an intelligent business man who is

capable of getting an education from the business world, but I should think less of the man who chose wealth with no culture.

17. (a) He is not morally blameworthy if he accepts the position. (b) I should not think less of him. In his choice he knows he can be equally happy, and probably do the world just as much good.

The results thus far reached do not tend to confirm the dogma of Kant that an erring conscience is a chimera; but, even so, we are not at the end of our evidence. Question II raised the problem whether the obligation to save the train is more binding in (a) than in (b). Of those who agree that the duty to the passengers was here supreme, sixteen express themselves with regard to this point, and, curiously enough, just half reply in the affirmative and half in the negative. To get the exact proportion, however, we should have to include among the former all those who admit the existence of doubt in the second case (indicated, as already explained, by the word "doubtful" after the answer) without giving any evidence of hesitation in the first. When these are counted, the total for the affirmative rises to fifteen.

There are several other examples of divergence of opinion that tempt us to describe them, but we shall allow ourselves space for only one more. Granted that a man's first duty is to his wife, when the choice has to be made between her safety and that of two other women, is such a duty an absolute one? Can an increase in the number of those who would thereby be sacrificed finally incline the balance the other way? Examples of both of these possible views have been given on page 208 (Nos. 164 and 129), from which it appears that again there is no unanimity of opinion. Once more we find the two parties almost evenly matched, there being ten who answer in the affirmative and eleven in the negative. The majority do not raise this question at all.

If our study has convinced us that the moral judgments of different persons are far removed from anything resembling uniformity, we may go on to inquire whether the decisions of the individual conscience will show any evidence of continued guidance by the same general principles. In other words, may we look for consistency in the "intuitions" of common sense? A study of the replies to II (b), V and VI, will throw some light on this subject. At bottom there are but two consistent attitudes to take with reference to these three questions; one must decide throughout in favor of either the closer relationship or the more widely diffused good. In II (b) and V, it is life against life; in VI (essentially), character against character. The only material difference between II and V lies in the number of

persons concerned. While this may be sufficient to clear some replies of the charge of inconsistency, it does not help those who assert that the duty of the husband would have been the same, however great the numerical discrepancy. The justification for a decision in favor of the son in VI and against the child in II (*b*) may lie either in the supposition that Howard's reform meant nothing more than clean beds once a week and apple sauce on Sunday, instead of the transformation of the English prison system from a school of vice to something approaching a direct moralizing agency. Or it may be urged that in II there was no possibility of the escape of the passengers, while in the case of Howard there was, at least, a chance that some one else would take up his work. Finally the opposite view, that the child should be saved in II (*b*), and the work of reform continued in VI may find its ground in the fact that in the former case it is at most hundreds competing with one, while in the latter we have the interests of uncounted thousands thrown into the scale. Now it has been found possible to compile a list containing all the combinations of answers that are mathematically possible in which not one inconsistency can be explained away in the above manner. The possible combinations are as follows:

	No. of representatives.	II (<i>b</i>).	V.	VI.
A.		r	r	r.
B.	2	r	r	w.
C.	2	r	w	w.
D.	1	r	w	r.
E.		w	w	w.
F.	2	w	w	r.
G.	4	w	r	r.
H.	4	w	r	w.

These have been obtained from 108 papers, which include the *A* and *E* answers.* Some of these combinations will appear, presumably, almost incredible, so we present a specimen of class *B*. 143: II (*b*). "I think he ought not to have turned the switch, because he was not to blame for the switch being open. (Doubtful.) V. It was his duty to save his own wife. VI. His duty lay in the work he had begun rather than in trying to reform his son, because if he did not, hundreds of lives would be ruined, and only one in the other case."

In order to assure ourselves of the existence of a contra-

* The distribution of answers here was as follows: *A*, 18; *B*, 6; *C*, 2; *D*, 1; *E*, 18; *F*, 5; *G*, 33; *H*, 25. The table gives the number of those that met the tests described in the text.

diction it was necessary, in this one case, to go beyond the text of the questionnaire. Some time after the papers had been handed in, the student who wrote the above was accordingly asked the following question: If this same alternative of the reformation of a number of prisoners and the reform of a dissipated son whose rescue imperatively demanded a removal to another town, had been presented to a prison official, whose opportunities for good were very insignificant compared with Howard's, one who, if he had remained in his present position, might have reasonably expected during the ensuing ten years to restore to a life of honorable citizenship perhaps twenty or thirty of these unfortunates, whereas the chances of the appointment of a successor who would take any interest in carrying on his work, were very slight, —in such a case should the decision be as in VI? The answer was, yes. "Would you have made this same reply, if the question had been given out originally in this form?" "Yes." "Is the principle underlying this judgment consistent with that of II (b)?" At once the admission was made that it was not. The inconsistency had quite escaped his attention, but could be explained by the fact that the thought of the helpless little child sitting upon the track, all unconscious of his fate, before the oncoming engine, had appealed very strongly to his sympathies. Paper 123 differed from 143 only by the absence of the "doubtful" after II. The supplementary question elicited the same reply. The explanation here is probably to be found in the fact that the person in question is preparing himself for "charity organization" work, and in a problem involving the obligation of philanthropy, the claims of the many appeal to his sympathies. With these two unambiguous statements in our possession, it did not seem necessary to continue the investigation to include the remaining four members of the group. No. 181, one of the two representatives of class *C*, on being interrogated, admitted the existence of inconsistency, with the same frankness as did 143. He professed himself quite unable to explain it, however, and could only say, "Each answer represents the way I felt in regard to that particular question."

D has but a single representative. His contradictions can be explained (whether they can be justified is another matter) by his own statement of principles prefixed to the paper handed in, and first conceived and formulated (as was learned later) on this occasion: "It is the first duty of every man to see to it that he leaves a family (children) behind him, and that they be trained and educated so that

they will become honorable and useful members of society." No other claims may take precedence of this. It would appear, however, that the supreme obligation has been met when a single child has been brought to maturity. II (*a*) and (*b*). "If the man had no other sons, or if the conditions were such that the probabilities of furthering my principle were very meagre, I think he would be morally justified in saving his son and wrecking the train; otherwise not." This law, in its absolute form at least, extends only to one's offspring; between husband and wife it does not apply. Therefore unless his fundamental principle is affected, "the man should save the two women." That "Howard's duty is to quit" is the only possible position that he could take with regard to VI.

Class *F*. At the risk of tediousness we quote 43:

II (*b*). I think even in this case the man should have turned the switch first of all. He certainly owed a duty to his son, but that duty did not extend to saving his son's physical life at the expense of many other lives. The son would not have been killed through his father's neglect, but there would simply have been another duty that stood in the father's way, preventing him from saving his son. I have thought very much about this question in connection with the sixth. It seems to me that the two cases are much alike, and yet I arrive at different conclusions regarding them. It is very hard for me to make clear why I do this, and yet I feel the difference. V. I think he ought to have warned the two other women, but I don't believe any man would. Doubtful. Only doubtful in that I can not give reasons [marginal note]. VI. I have already spoken of this in connection with II (*b*). I think his first duty was to his son. One should not do evil that good may come, and it seems to me that he would be doing wrong to deliberately neglect his son in order that he might work even needed reforms. He was responsible for his son's existence, and so it was more his duty to see that he led a moral life than it was to work reforms for other people.

This paper is notable as one of the three (out of the total of seventy-two) that betray the slightest consciousness of the contradictions they are guilty of.

G and *H* do not call for special mention or extended quotation. No paper was admitted into either of these classes that was not fully as definite as 164 V (page 208) and 184 VI (page 209). Three or four did not give their opinion upon the broader problem raised by 164 until interviewed personally. The others supplied the needed information on their own initiative.

To many this entire exposition of the diversities in moral judgments will seem as much out of date as a polemic against the doctrine of the divine right of kings. It is just these whose attention we would bespeak for the method which has been used in this investigation. What we need to-day is a sense of the possibility—and the neces-

sity—of a systematic inductive study of the nature and extent of the divergencies in moral judgment among the members of the society in which we live, in order to supply us with material on which to build up a theory of the causes of such divergencies, this to pave the way or to form an element in a comprehensive theory of the conditions of moral judgment in general. The notion that such a theory already exists is an illusion. What we do find is a number of warring “types,” each of which owes its existence to the fact that it formulates in a more or less superficial fashion such portions of the moralist’s personal ideals as have happened to attract his particular attention. Those whose views are given out as a “synthesis” of “rigorism” and “hedonism” seem to imagine themselves raised above the narrowness and pettiness of the hitherto prevailing sectarianism. But without disparagement to their services to ethics, it must be said that the trail of the personal equation is over all they have written, and like those who have gone before them they have simply attached themselves to that which was congenial to their own temperament, leaving neglected much that must find a place in the completed whole. It is indeed true enough that the collection of data can never take the place of the work of interpretation, but what we need to insist upon now is that the second can never be completed till the range of the first be extended far, far beyond its present limits. One of the (we hope) many methods by which this may be done we are endeavoring to exhibit.

The next subject of inquiry shall be the alleged immediacy of moral judgments. The students were requested to indicate after each answer the length of time required to reach a decision. Unfortunately many neglected to do so, but a sufficient number sent in replies to supply data for some provisional generalizations. The first point to be noted is that the type described by Martineau and to which he evidently belongs, is so far represented as to establish firmly the fact of its existence. Five of the writers state at the close of their papers that they decided “at once” or “almost immediately” upon first reading the questions. Two others spent less than a minute a piece on each problem. This group of seven may from this point of view at least be looked upon as our “intuitionists.” Whether they satisfy other requirements will appear later. Six of them are men, a proportion which, if it should turn out to be something more than an accident due to the meagre nature of the returns, would require a modification of some popular notions. It should be stated that, in addition to

these, ten—seven of whom are men—report an instant decision of a majority of the questions. The other extreme is equally well represented. Nine students report periods spent upon one, two or three questions ranging from one to three days. What this may mean appears from the statement of 167 I: "I thought about this question a day and a half; should estimate an hour and a half spent on all phases of it." Three persons experienced this difficulty with a single question; two, with two; three, with three, and one with four. The problems that caused the delay were, with four scattered exceptions, I (in the main I (*a*)), six persons; II (*b*), five persons; V, two persons, and VI, three persons. In most of these, lengthened meditation would hardly have been possible in real life! Two others report spending "a long time" on one question, and of VI, 25 writes: "I do not know." This question, or one of like import, has often occurred to me before, but I have never been able to answer it satisfactorily to myself." Of the eleven who finally found an answer after their attack of hesitation, six were young women. Between these two extremes are ranged the great majority, averaging about an hour in aggregate time, though what proportion of this was required in order to reach their decision, and how much of it was devoted to subsequent reflection, it is impossible to tell. Still it must be admitted that if Martineau's account of the process were of universal validity, no such reflection would be necessary, at least in most of these problems.* Frequently the aggregate rises as high as three hours; only in a few instances does it fall below half an hour, except, of course, in the group of seven first mentioned. In general the young women seem to make up their minds more slowly than the young men, but this may possibly be because they are more conscientious in the performance of their task. No valuable correlations have been discovered, partly, no doubt, because of the meagreness of the data; partly also, it would seem, because none exist. It is highly instructive, however, to observe 182 answering V after three days' deliberation in the affirmative ("He should have saved his wife"), while another decides it in the negative, "at once"; equally so, to find still a third replying in the affirmative, "as soon as read." 39 spends one day upon VI, and concludes Howard should have devoted himself to saving his son; 33 after two days decides Howard's duty lay with the prisoners. A large number of others could be found who were able to decide it in either way at a glance.

* *Vide supra* page 201.

What is true of immediacy holds of certainty; both extremes exist and must be included in the count when the census taker goes his round. The man who knows black from white is well represented; he says "of course," "it is perfectly obvious that," "without hesitation I should answer," "his choice was *decidedly* wrong," etc. For others these same problems are not so easy. Not infrequently the writer is unable to come to any decision whatever, as will be seen by consulting the first table. About two per cent. of the answers are marked "doubtful," indicating that no assurance is felt of their correctness. Not infrequently a second answer, contradicting the first and intended to correct it, is written in with lead pencil, or placed in the margin; or the change of heart may be indicated as follows: 160. "He should have saved his wife. On first thought it seemed to me that the man should have saved the two women, as less suffering would be caused by the death of the wife than by that of the other two; but I finally came to the conclusion that the man was under certain obligations to save his wife which would outweigh the demands that the others made upon him." Five such conversions are admitted, one each for questions I (*d*) (*e*) (*f*), V and IX and two for II (*b*). Finally one student confesses having torn up his first paper in dissatisfaction, and having started again from the beginning. For the most part doubts and difficulties are confined for a single person to one or two of the ten main problems. In seven instances, however, the total rises to three or more. The record is as follows: 35 is unable to answer III (*b*) (*c*) (*d*) and is doubtful about V; 44 is doubtful about I, II and VI; 45 about VI, VII, VIII and X (2); 21, about II (*b*), III (*c*) and (*d*), IX (2) and X; 125, about I (*a*) (*d*)-(*f*), II, V, VI; and 145, about I, V, VIII and IX. 111, who is doubtful about I (*c*), II (*a*) and (*b*) and X, writes in conclusion: "I am not yet quite satisfied with some of my answers," and 125 closes his paper in a similar strain. Thus we find the same contrasts reappearing that we met with in dealing with the time relations.

An attempt to correlate, either certainty or doubt, with the nature of the opinions stated, showed plainly that there was no fixed principle of connection. It is possible that a survey of a wider field might lead to a different conclusion, but a study of the 1500 answers before us leads to no definite results. A close relation between immediacy and certainty on the one hand, between hesitation and ultimate uncertainty on the other, is far more probable. But what with the pov-

erty of the data at our disposal it can not be demonstrated. Nevertheless such facts as these are point in that direction.

We are now free to turn our attention to the controversy between Martineau and Sidgwick with regard to the object of moral judgments. Is conduct invariably judged right or wrong because of its perceived relation to the welfare of those who will be affected by it? Or is it approved or condemned directly at a glance according to the intrinsic worth or nobility of the motives by which it has been determined? Fitly to conduct this discussion we should have to inquire into the exact nature of "moral worth," as Martineau conceives it. Is it a name for that element, or those elements of character which call forth direct admiration, for that which Plato and Aristotle held aloft under the name of the beautiful, and which he of the "pasteboard" and "the battered hack" had in mind when he said: "Observe, Sancho, that there are two kinds of beauty, the beauty of the body and that of the soul?" To answer this question properly we should have to go far afield, for Martineau's statements on this subject are by no means coherent, the obscurity being due, in our opinion, mainly to a confusion on his part between two different questions: "What is the quality that gives virtue its value? and, What is the ground of that obligation to pursue it which is held to exist quite apart from its attractiveness to any individual mind? We are invariably informed that the latter is to be found in the will of God, and sometimes this seems to be looked upon as the source of its value also. But here a difficulty arises. On the one hand the idea of obligation can not be divorced from that of value, on the other, the value of conduct will never be placed by a man with a keen sense for realities in its mere conformity to the fiat of Omnipotence. Martineau has never succeeded in discovering the clue out of this labyrinth, hence contradiction in statement and confusion of thought. On the whole, balancing his explicit denial of the identity between moral worth and beauty of character* (where the reasoning is plainly fallacious) against the almost equally explicit affirmation of a later passage,** and attributing the

*"If I follow impulse A, instead of B, my volition will be 'higher,'—in what scale? . . . Of beauty? Not so, for I have no such feeling for my pug nose, though I wish it were straight."—"Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II, p. 46.

** "It will probably appear to many of my readers that these two concessions—that we have the power of recognizing a distinction of kind in our pleasures, and that we have a perception of beauty in our actions—make the difference between Mr. Mill and intuitive moralists not very much more than verbal!" Quoted from Lecky, *ibid.*, p. 330.

statement of the preceding paragraph* to the failure above noted to distinguish in the proper way between the grounds of value (the grounds on which God's own preferences may be supposed to rest), and the grounds of obligation,—on the whole we may affirm confidently that the actual phenomena our author has in view throughout are those to which the “inward eye” responds in much the same way as does sense and intellect to the daisy by the river's brim, or the starry heavens above us. At all events, apart from doubtful points of interpretation, both attitudes, the utilitarian and the aesthetic, may be taken towards the facts of the world of matter and of consciousness, and we may accordingly ask whether they appear as determining factors in our judgments of right and wrong.

A study of the replies to questions I, III, IV, VII, VIII and X will supply us with material which may aid us to a conclusion that shall be something more than a mere affirmation of personal preferences. It will show that Martineau and Sidgwick are both right in what they affirm, wrong in what they deny; that some value conduct primarily for what it brings, others, for what it reveals. In consequence the conditions of approbation appear to be not simple, as each supposes, but complex. One class of persons applies habitually one standard, a second another, while still a third, not the least numerous, alternate in the use of each, employing now one, now another, or both concurrently. The relations of these two types of moral judgment to each other, the question whether one can exist in entire independence of the other, the question whether there are other types besides these, and the exposition of the conditions which give rise to these diverse and seemingly contradictory attitudes—these are problems of the highest importance and interest. We shall confine ourselves, however, to the mere exposition of the facts themselves. This self-imposed limitation must excuse any apparent abstractness in our presentation of the two types of the approving judgment, whose existence we shall attempt to demonstrate; as if we attributed one “faculty” to one set of persons which we denied to another. It is always true that if a correct view of the facts themselves is to be obtained, mere descrip-

* “When the sense of beauty spreads from the sensible world to that of *character*, it goes only where the good has gone before it. . . . Character is not admired till it is there; and it is there, by the self-knowledge and self-assertion of ethical differences. Its rightness is not conditional on its beauty; but its beauty on its rightness.” *Ibid.*, p. 329.

tion must be supplemented by explanation. But this would require a separate paper.

In the citation to replies to I, on page 207, we confined ourselves to such as looked at the problem solely as one involving a conflict of interests; the difference in the decisions rendered simply registering divergent views as to the priority of one claim which was in conflict with another. But there are persons with whom considerations of this nature, though not of necessity completely absent, retreat into the background, and the judgment is confessedly dictated by admiration for the personal qualities—that is to say, the springs of action—conceived to be displayed. As representative of such an attitude we may quote the following:

127. Such heroic conduct is indeed worthy of admiration under any circumstances. This is carrying out the marriage vow to love, cherish and protect to an extreme and certainly far beyond the point where failure to act could be justly criticised. Most mothers would be proud to know they had such a son, and that thought would be likely to comfort his mother in her old age. Leaving out the emotional side an invalid is no help to society, and if his life served merely to prolong her existence, the benefit might fairly be questioned. [(d)-(f). Some one would probably come forward to take his place.]

180 (a). It would seem to me in this case he showed a devotion to his wife which was commendable and heroic. To be sure, his purpose might have been thwarted, inasmuch as his wife's pain would be increased at the sight of her husband's sufferings. But he had no time to weigh all this, and I think that under such circumstances he showed a strong and brave character.

56 (a). He did nobly. A man would be a coward who would save himself and leave his wife to perish alone when he had no one else to think of. (b) He certainly ought not to bring grief to his mother when he could possibly spare her. This [entire] question troubles me greatly. Such a death is equivalent to suicide, and of course from a moral point of view that is wrong under any circumstances. But, right or wrong, if I were his mother, I'm sure I should rather he did not desert his wife. (c) I fear it is his duty to live in this case, but I am sure his conscience would trouble him ever after for leaving his wife. However, I may not be looking at this question rightly, but it seems much more heroic unselfishly to die with his wife rather than to live when she could not (as far as comforting her last moments is concerned, it would be more of a comfort to her to know that he was safe; and she could die as bravely alone, I hope). I find I can't answer this question at all. My intellect seems to tell me it is his duty to live; he has a duty to perform on earth which no one else can do. (d) I don't think one clergyman more or less would make any difference, and he ought to stay with his wife. (e) Better to stay with his wife; the electric telegraph would have been invented sooner or later anyway. (f) Stay with his wife. In this case he has no duty to perform, and the good he might do to the world as an artist is very vague. I am not satisfied at all with these answers. I think, if the question of suicide did not arise continually in my mind, they would satisfy me.

The last quotation is extraordinarily clear and definite because her position is taken in direct defiance to all utilitarian considerations. His presence at his wife's side would have done no good of any kind, because "it would have been more of a comfort to her to know that he was safe;" nevertheless it was heroic to remain, and for this reason he should have done so, regardless of his mother, of society at large, and perhaps even of the dependent invalid. At the same time the intensity of her feeling is shown by the evidently painful character of the running fight carried on between her direct approvals and the protests called forth by her subsumption of the action under suicide.

Of our 152 papers, nineteen answer the question in this spirit and from this point of view, at least in (*a*), and some of them throughout. Six or eight more might perhaps find a place in this list, but their statements are not full or definite enough to classify with any degree of certainty. Twenty condemn the act as suicide. For the remainder it is simply a question as to which of two parties may justly claim the man's services—of where he could do the most good, or whether the close relationship between husband and wife justifies him in choosing to support and comfort her during a few brief moments at the cost of sorrow or privation to another, or of some loss to society at large.

Of the answers to III, fourteen are certainly judgments of admiration; twenty-two are too brief or too ambiguous to be classified; the rest are utilitarian, claiming either that no moral question was involved, at least in (*a*) and (*b*), and sometimes throughout, or asserting that he should have refused the position because of the danger in permitting trickery to succeed, or putting forward some reason which consisted in a reference to the effects of his action upon the welfare of some of those concerned, or society at large. Of course, some of those who answer, "No moral question involved," may have failed to express a preference for one spring of action over the other only because they failed to notice this aspect of the case. But, if so, we may infer that they were not in the habit of settling moral problems by looking for the competing motives and noting their relative rank, as Martineau claims is habitually done. So that while our figures would probably have varied slightly if we had analyzed our problems and exhibited for our students all their bearings, yet the results in so far as they were different would undoubtedly have given a far less correct notion of every-day modes of moral judgment. Examples of the two varieties of answers have been given on page 212, and

additional ones will be found in the appendix. In what follows, all examples will be found under the discussion of variations in moral judgment, and in the four papers which are quoted entire at the close of this article.

In IV there are thirty-three answers (class 1 in the first table) that explicitly recognize the existence of a conflict between two motives, desire for the money offered, and fear of the dark. Only sixteen of these hold that he does wrong to give way to his desire for the money—that he chooses the lower motive thereby, and if we add to this number all those who are counted in class 2, we have at most twenty-five. Five others think that he ought to go, but give no reasons. A number condemn him for going because of the injury he may do himself by the nervous shock,—these do not appear in the table at all. The rest content themselves with asserting that there is no moral obligation one way or the other, the few who vouchsafe any explanation adding, “because he didn’t do himself or anyone else any harm.”

The answers to VII must be divided into four groups. (1) contains the ambiguous ones—“Prospero’s choice was praiseworthy,” or the reverse. Here are to be found twenty-four papers, all but one of which approve of his actual choice. (2) Culture is declared to be an intrinsically higher or nobler pursuit than power—judgments of the form that Martineau’s theory requires. Two of the total of eight are cited on page 212, and two on 231 and 232. (3) Seventy-seven judgments are rendered from a purely utilitarian standpoint; *v.* references as above. (4) The answer is simply: “No moral question involved.” Even after making all possible allowances for obtuseness of vision these judgments seem as directly incompatible with Martineau’s theory as those of (3). In fact, in the great majority of cases it is undoubtedly the same position, stated without explanation of the grounds on which the decision is made.

An examination of the replies to VIII leads to similar results. Martineau’s attitude is represented by nineteen papers. There is not, however, complete agreement as to which spring of action is to be assigned the higher rank, seventeen deciding in favor of affection, one for ambition, while in one the writer declares himself unable to choose. But even in this small number we find eleven introducing utilitarian considerations, as does 194, for instance (*v.* appendix), leaving but eight in which the attention is directed solely to the intrinsic worth of the motives themselves, without any thought of other considerations. Eleven others condemn the choice of ambition without assigning their reason, and five more make the same reply with the understand-

ing that Pitt's motives were purely selfish. Still another group, again numbering eleven, hold that an obligation exists in favor of one course, but do not appear to find its ground in the relative rank of the contending motives; the considerations adduced are, in the main, the obligation due to himself to marry in such a way as will best conduce to his own happiness, or the duty of considering the lady's happiness, provided that he really loves her, or the duty he is alleged to owe himself to rise in fame and power as high as his abilities will carry him. Ninety-one consider no moral question to be involved—he is free to do as he pleases. About half of them assign no reason for their conclusion; the remainder fall into several groups, according to the nature of the conditions under which alone their decision is stated to hold good; of these the principal ones are that the young lady's feelings are not to be taken into account, and that Pitt was to no appreciable degree moved in his choice by a desire to be useful to his country.

The same types recur in X. Those whose judgments are clearly based upon a comparison of the intrinsic excellence of the competing motives here number twenty-seven, of whom six fortify their conclusion by the claim that a man of education can be of more value to the world than a man of wealth. Fifteen others cannot be classified; some of them may perhaps belong to the first group. Two find it impossible to make up their minds whether any obligation exists in favor of either one of the alternatives or not. Twenty-five judgments are plainly representatives of the pure utilitarian standpoint. Finally seventy-six assert that no moral obligation exists to choose one course rather than the other. The question, "Would you think better of a man for choosing one or the other of these alternatives?" forces everyone to face the problem of the relative excellence of culture and wealth as ends of action, so that members of this group have practically placed themselves outside the pale of Martineau's theory. With regard to this last question, forty-five would think better of him for choosing the college education, twenty-one would think neither more nor less of him for so doing, and ten do not reply. For example *v.* page 213 and appendix.

Of the four remaining questions little need be said. Express or implied references to the relative rank of motives do not appear except in isolated instances. In II (*b*) the majority of 109 argue, except in two or three cases, after the manner of 179, the minority like 123 (page 208). Answers such as that of 16 (page 231), stand as solitary as Heine's fir tree. And yet if throughout attention has been directed immedi-

ately upon the quality of the motives, we cannot but wonder that the fact does not appear in the language employed. The same results appear in V, VI and IX. The decision in V and VI seems always to turn on the place where the superior obligation to service lay; of course, this may be *interpreted* as equivalent to asking whether conjugal or parental affection is higher than compassion for several or for many; on the other hand there is no evidence that the problem presented itself in this form to the minds of the writers. Again in IX the majority who, it will be remembered, subscribe to Gray's well-known creed, mention no other consideration than the happiness or the character at stake, while in the ranks of the minority appears no one who writes on his banner: The impulse to make others sharers in our own views of truth is higher than a regard for their happiness. The nearest approach to such a formula has been given on page 210.

If the evidence adduced has been sufficient to establish as a fact the application of these two criteria—the aesthetic and the utilitarian—to the solution of moral problems, it only remains to inquire whether the causes, whatever they may be, that produce either of the two corresponding attitudes are operative in the same persons under all circumstances; whether, in other words, there is a type of mind for which Martineau's description holds without exception and another which stands in a similar relation to Sidgwick's theory. Beginning with the latter, we may propose a looser and a more severe test. If we count as utilitarians those who appeal explicitly and exclusively to the effects of the action under consideration upon the happiness of the agent, or other individuals, or the welfare of society at large, in one or more of the following questions, viz.: I (*a*), III (*a*), IV, VII, VIII, X, and who, furthermore, nowhere introduce any references to the qualities of springs of action or the relative superiority of one over the other, we shall have a group with sixty-seven members. On the other hand we may adopt a criterion which seems to exclude the possibility of any mistake. We may count only those who in every one of these six questions either make a direct and unambiguous appeal to utilitarian considerations, and to these alone*, or who, while recognizing in any given case the existence of a conflict between two impulses, assert that there is no obligation to choose either one or the other (for example, *v.* papers 53 and

*This is interpreted so as to exclude from the group those who in I (*a*) condemn the action of the clerk as suicide.

37, p. 213.) This second condition was introduced primarily to cover a single answer in one paper, 191, which beyond all doubt belongs to this group. It will be referred to again on page 231. As a result of this sifting process we have nine papers of whose attitude there can be no possible doubt; in fact, they read as if written to serve as illustrations for the "Methods of Ethics." In the appendix two of them will be found quoted in full; they were selected as representing very well what may be roughly distinguished as the philosophic and the common sense types of utilitarianism respectively. Positive assurance can be given that neither the writers of these nor of the other two papers quoted in the same place, had ever made any study or ever done any reading in the field of systematic or applied ethics or of philosophy in general, or had picked up ideas or theories from other students who had done so. Their views, and the language in which these were expressed, were purely their own, with the exception, of course, of the ever popular "greatest good to the greatest number," which, it appears, was picked up in the university debating societies, where it has long been a favorite weapon.

Turning now to the use made of the aesthetic criterion, we should expect to meet with a similar showing. Quite the reverse, however, is true. Its appearance at intervals is indubitable, but with rare exceptions, its employment is sporadic, confined, in the main—as our evidence goes to show—to one or two problems. Not only do considerations conceived in this spirit fail to appear, with an occasional exception, in II, V, VI and IX, but there is no one example of its use in all the remaining six questions. No. 194, whose paper is given in full on page 232, is alone in exhibiting the presence of this point of view in as many as five answers; but on the other hand, the union of the aesthetic and the utilitarian standpoint is particularly marked in him. Four others decide four questions on grounds of admiration for springs of action; four more decide three in the same manner; thirteen others, two, and forty-six, one; making a total of sixty-eight who show some trace of the use of the "aesthetic method of ethics." * Of these there are but four who in every case keep themselves entirely "unspotted" from utilitarianism, as that was defined in making up the second group of nine (page 227). The exclusion of those who, while distinctly recognizing the fact of a conflict between certain

* We have seventeen papers left that are still unaccounted for. They gave no reasons for their replies in any instance and their position is therefore impossible to determine.

motives, refuse to adjudge one higher than the other may on first thought seem arbitrary, but we have Martineau's own statement (and it is in the main his doctrines that we are testing) that whenever two impulses come into competition, one of them is immediately recognized as the higher. Moreover, the application of this test excludes but six at the most. One of these is 16, the propriety of whose rejection (on the ground of her answer to III) may perhaps be questioned. If this is allowed to stand we have but one member of this small group of four who answers as many as three questions from the aesthetic point of view. The other three are included on account of their answer to a single question; as outside of this they vouchsafe no reasons for their conclusions whatever, their presence in this group may perhaps be merely due to their preference of golden silence over silver speech. In the appendix will be found paper 16, which, everything considered, comes nearer to representing the type of mind described by Martineau than any other in our possession. 194 is of interest as an example of the fusion of the two modes of judging. The following table exhibits the nature of the answers to our six test questions of the nine leading representatives of the aesthetic attitude. *a* indicates that the answer was based on grounds such as Martineau would lead us to expect to find; *u* is utilitarian in the sense defined on page 227; a dash indicates that the answer was rejected on account of ambiguity, or for some of the other reasons referred to in the earlier part of this article; a question mark, that the writer gives no reasons by which his attitude can be determined; *u* with a question mark, that the writer, without explicitly mentioning the two competing impulses and without stating the grounds for his opinion, affirms that no moral problem is involved. *S* in I means that suicide was assigned as the ground for condemnation.

No.	I (a)	III (a)	IV	VII	VIII	X
11	a	-	?	a	a	u (?)
16	s	u	a	a	a	a
26	a	u	u	a	a	{ a u
35	u	a	?	a	a	a
39	u	a	a	u	u	a
48	u	a	u (?)	{ a u	a	{ a u
127	a	a	-	u	u	a
141	?	a	a	u	a	u
194	u	a	a	a	{ a u	a

Should a broader induction confirm the results here obtained, we should have to admit the existence of at least

two "methods of ethics" which may even dwell in the same mind side by side. Furthermore, we should be compelled to recognize the fact that on the whole the aesthetic plays a subordinate rôle in comparison with the utilitarian, and that even in those to whom it means most it may disappear at times before the pressure of the demands of the "utilities." How impossible it is for the mind to so far abstract from the felicitous consequences of conduct as to deny them any share in the formulation of moral judgments, is well shown by the following remark of Martineau, incidentally dropped in the discussion of other matters: "By importing a distinction of finer or more vulgar into human satisfactions, you do not step into the region of morals, but only change the field of extra-moral good. . . . All that you can say to any one [who prefers the coarser to the more refined] is, 'You do not make the best of the resources of your nature:' and he may answer, 'Perhaps not; but I am the only sufferer by the waste, and am therefore a squanderer only, and not an offender; I wrong no one but myself; and am simply a poorer economist.'"* The note here struck is entirely out of harmony with all else that he has written, but it reveals the existence of forces which, ignore them as he may in his hours of speculation, undoubtedly play an important part in his every-day judgments of right and wrong. Not that Martineau has entirely ignored the existence of a "canon of consequences;" no one could possibly do that.** But he has failed to recognize the importance of the part it plays in the life of men, and he has not succeeded in assigning to it its proper place in the constitution of the human mind, nor, as a result, in defining properly its relation to those forms of judgments with which he is most familiar. Similarly, the utilitarians, while to-day commonly admitting the existence of beauty of character as a fact, have never seriously investigated the nature and the extent of its influence in determining the attitude of men towards the concrete problems of the morality of given lines of conduct.

It has been impossible to establish the existence of any definite relations between the employment of one or the other of these methods and the time required to form a decision, and the certainty with which its affirmation is accompanied. The nine papers whose answers are tabulated on previous page do not differ materially in either of these respects from the remaining ones. Some answered at once, while others spent a day on the same question. On the whole this

* "Types of Ethical Theory," II, 109.

** Cf., for example, the statement on p. 271, beginning: "I will not say that no one ever . . . with Bentham, consulted the arithmetic of pleasures and pains, and struck their balance."

was to be expected. This type of mind will often find its way blocked by a conflict between what it admires and what it judges useful, a conflict to which a mind of the type represented by 191 or 192 is an entire stranger. Moreover, so much, at least, is known of the phenomena of "intuition" as to prove that there is nothing incompatible in it with judgments based in reality upon a great mass of data.

In concluding this study we may call attention to the possibilities thrown open by the method we have exhibited of an objective investigation into the causes of moral judgments. If the various answers given to questions such as these can be correlated with various mental traits, with the power of abstraction, the power and habitual direction of the imagination, with temperament, age, sex and environment, or if when brought face to face with his own inconsistencies, the person questioned can be led to describe the nature of the difference between his various attitudes toward a series of similar problems,—if this and much more of the same kind can be done, the foundation will have been laid for a theory of the conditions of moral judgment, which shall not be at the mercy of either the ideals or the whims of individuals or passing generations. Some fragmentary data of the kind demanded have been thrown into our way in the course of this investigation, but it has seemed advisable to withhold them because they can acquire real significance only as part of a system of facts, most of which still await the discoverer.

APPENDIX.

No. 16.

I. In any of the conditions he committed suicide. A man may rush into danger when there is hope of saving anyone—lose his life in so doing—that would be bravery. In this case escape of his wife was impossible—he knew it—and by remaining there he deliberately took his own life.

II (a). He must turn the switch and save the passengers. (b) To save his child would be the natural and instinctive action, but to save the train would be a higher, more sublime choice. Morally he would be bound to save the train.

III (a). No moral obligation one way or other.

(b). No moral obligation one way or other.

(c) If he had no chance for other employment he is morally bound to "swallow discomfiture" and accept position. (d) Morally bound to accept position.

IV. If the child accepted money he yielded to a lower motive, chose a lower alternative. He should be taught to do right for right's sake, not for money.

V. He should save his wife—he had promised sacredly to protect her. To the other women he did not owe this moral obligation.

VI. The duty of John Howard was to save his son. Parental responsibility outweighs any philanthropy.

VII. If the brother had no taste for any other employment than politics, Prospero's choice was praiseworthy. If the brother was

equally fitted [to rule], Prospero's choice was again praiseworthy, as one should, when possible, cultivate all talents with which he is endowed. He owes it to himself to do so.

VIII. To sacrifice love to ambition is to follow a lower motive. Ambition is sordid and selfish. From the moral standpoint he should accept love and fling away ambition.

IX (a). It is decidedly *not* your duty to attempt to undeceive him in either case. The theology of the world is in too doubtful a state to attempt to say definitely how much of truth a man has. (b) I should think it wrong in both cases.

X. If he has any one dependent upon him he is bound to accept the position, if immediate support is required. If there are no "encumbrances," if he is entirely free, the higher choice would be in favor of cultivating the mind. Wealth is a baser motive than literary attainments.

No. 194.

I (a)-(f). He would not be justified in dying with his wife. The Bible says care for the living and not for the dead. The woman in question is not dead of course, but comes within the application. It would be extremely selfish on her part to expect him to sacrifice his enjoyment of life and to expect others to forego the good he might do them. In most of these conditions great good is conceded [as accruing] to his fellow-men from him. For him to die would be a loss of the benefits of (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) to mankind. This would seem to be wrong, opposed to the express commands of Christ. Temporary comfort to the wife set over against permanent good to the world. I cannot see why (a) should be excluded either. If the clerk does some good, his life is a benefit and should be prolonged.

II (a). The man should have decided in favor of the lives of the passengers. (b) Same decision. In these cases the man was choosing between a greater and a smaller sum total of suffering. He looked [should look] upon himself and others from an objective point of view and sacrificed [sacrifice] his child on the broad principle that it was better for one man to endure, even if it was he, than that many should suffer. [The fact that he was on] duty did not make his decision more compulsory; it is not plain how a sense of duty can claim to compete at all in such a case with such a broad principle [as that just laid down] or even strengthen it.

III. I think that he is under moral obligation to reject the \$600 proposition in every case. Evidently a wrong has been committed; his own self-respect demands that he do not tamely submit to being tricked, and besides he should not be a party to the successful issue of the low scheme. Even if his wife (in c and d) had requested him to accept the position, his duty would still be as above, for there is always some way of earning a living.

IV. The child has done wrong if he goes, though the offense is light. He did for money what he ought to have done for a higher motive, namely, desire to strengthen his courage.

V. To warn the two women. Same principle as in I and II, the greatest good to the greatest number, and least sum of suffering. Warning his wife would bring more satisfaction to himself and less to others, but this would be selfish. He is supposed to look upon all as on the plane of common humanity, not as separated by artificial ties.

VI. His duty lay with the work begun. Same principle as in I, II and V. . . . Could Moody well stay home to bring up a son?

VII. The choice was praiseworthy morally because culture is a nobler aim than power. The better a man becomes himself the

better able he is to influence others to a higher life. Prospero became more noble and could bring others up to a higher level. His self-denial was itself a growth. The city was ruled as before.

VIII. Pitt's decision was unpraiseworthy morally. It was directly contrary to the principle involved in VII. He repressed love, an ennobling feeling, for selfishness, a degenerating impulse. Such selfishness persisted in might have made a spoils politician of Pitt at this day and made him less useful to his country in advocating good measures, etc., than he would have been even holding a lower position, but with higher motives.

IX. I should not consider it my duty simply on the condition of his being a Spiritualist and with results as in (a) and (b). I think it would be wrong to say anything that would bring about the results in (a) and (b). Right living and spiritual inspirations are objective things in religion, and these would not be improved by the results in (a) or (b). One would think that a Spiritualist could secure the main benefits of religion which he could not under (a) and (b)—not as well anyway. The best sum of good should here be aimed at.

X. He seems to me to be morally blameworthy. With the opportunity for either business or a college course he should choose the latter. Culture and the development of the mind are granted higher aims than money, are declared and recognized to be higher.

No. 191.

I. A question whether deliberate suicide can or can not be called morally right. To my mind it cannot. In these cases a man, in order to give a few moments of comfort to a dying person, deliberately gives up a life which might accomplish untold good to many hundreds. He certainly could accomplish during a lifetime results of infinitely more value than the uncertain comfort or support given in this case.

II. Love and human nature *versus* duty. Doubtless he should have saved the train because by so doing he could save a greater number of lives than in the other case. However, the ties of blood are so strong that in nine cases out of ten the man would save the child. (b) The decision should be the same.

III (a) and (b). Do not appear to me to be questions of morals, but of ordinary sense. (a) If by waiting he could get a better position in the future, he had better spend his capital and wait. (b) Better go to work at a low salary, although tricked, than to starve—pride does not furnish a substantial repast. (c) and (d) Same as (a) and (b).

IV. I think it is a question of the desire of money overcoming the fear of the dark. If any moral question is involved it seems to me to be on the side of the parents that allowed the child to grow up in fear of the dark. Then it would become a question as to the means of obtaining a desired end, whether bribery is an allowable means of obtaining this end—I think it is.

V. Question of duty to your wife or to two persons not at all connected with you; of the death of one or two persons. I presume, looking at it from the good to the world and ignoring self, one should save two lives rather than one, but the other being his wife I should say save the wife. A man owes his first duty to his family, after that to the world.

VI. Drop his work and take care of his son. There would be others who could attend to the prison reforms. No one is so all-important that his place cannot be filled.

VII. I think it may or may not be a question of morals. If he gave up political power because it was distasteful to him and

science was pleasant, he cannot be either praised or blamed, as it was simply a question of natural tendencies and of what was pleasant to self. On the other hand if both were equally pleasant and he carefully weighed the amount of good which each would accomplish for mankind and found that in his opinion science and culture would do the most, and chose the latter, I should say his choice was praiseworthy.

VIII. Does not seem to be a case of morals, but of self-gratification, the amount of pleasure being greater in one case than in the other, the desire for fame being greater than that for love.

IX. I should consider it wrong to do so in both cases. He is sincere and content with his belief and harming no one.

X. I think that culture could be obtained in great measure after he had reached a certain stage of his career (travel, literature, environment, etc.). At any rate if he is as fully satisfied with his life of business as he would have been with the culture obtained from his college education, and, on the other hand, if the latter would enable him to be a success in his chosen career after leaving college, I should say it was a matter of choice, either career being one of fame and honor.

No. 192.

I. In answer to question I, I would say that the man was wrong in staying with his wife in this crisis, for this reason, that it is the duty and mission of every man to do something for the good of the world; this is the object of life. In cases (b)-(f) there can be no doubt that he did wrong in sacrificing himself.

II. I think that in (b) the switchman should have saved the passengers. Reason: By abandoning the child he saved lives more valuable to the world. In case (a) he should certainly attend to his duty, because his obligation to the passengers is greater than that to the child. I believe any father in such a case would save his child, but I think his moral obligation to his fellow-men should preponderate.

III (a) and (b). I think that it was the man's duty to accept the position because of his duty to his fellow-men. By his teaching he would benefit a portion of his fellows; by staying idle he would not. In cases (c) and (d) he was morally obliged to accept.

IV. It is the child's moral duty to himself to refuse to go into the room; by so doing he injures himself and benefits no one.

V. I think it was the duty of the man to warn the two women.

VI. Here is the duty of father to son contrasted with the duty of man to his fellow-men; it is the duty of man to do the greatest possible good, hence I think that it was Howard's duty to carry on the work of prison reform.

VII. I think that Prospero was not only justified, but that it was his duty to leave the government to his brother, because by so doing the greatest benefit to his fellow-men could be wrought.

VIII. In No. VIII I do not think that any moral question was involved. If he had led the lady to believe he was going to marry her, his action would have been wrong; but as only his own happiness was affected by his choice, he was free to do as he pleased.

IX. It would certainly be wrong in case (b) to deceive him, and also in case (a). In case (b) you would do harm to him and no good to others unless he was converting others to his belief. The same is true of case (a). If you believed that he was harming others by his belief, you would be justified.

X. It would certainly be his duty to refuse the position offered him and to attend college; by so doing he would prepare himself to bring about the greatest good.